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Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL*

Can the United Nations (UN or Organization) send military forces into
civil war without the consent of the parties to the conflict? To date, it
never has,I but with the end of the Cold War, the Organization is in a
position to think again about its proper role in civil war. 2 During the past
year, the Security Council has had requests to intervene in the civil wars in
Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Somalia. So far, the UN has sent troops to Iraq3
and Yugoslavia4 but only after getting the consent of all parties.5
The Security Council's recent decisions conform with the requirements of
the UN Charter. Under the Charter, the Organization may not interfere in
the internal affairs of member states. 6 Moreover, the Charter prohibits the
Security Council from taking enforcement action except in response to
threats to international peace and security.7 Nevertheless, Brian Urquhart,
former head of UN peacekeeping, has recently called for UN intervention
in Yugoslavia, regardless of consent, in order to establish a cease-fire and
bring about a quicker end to the bloodshed." Urquhart joins others who
have in recent years called for changing or reinterpreting the Charter to
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington.
1. For a full discussion of UN nonmilitary, as well as military, intervention in civil war
before 1974, see Schacter, The United Nations and Internal Conflict, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR
IN THE MODERN WORLD 401-45 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
2. Since President Gorbachev's speech to the UN in 1986, UN members have engaged in
an active debate over the Organization's role in many realms, especially with regard to peace
and security. See, e.g., McFadden, Leaders Gather in New York to Chart a World Order,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1992, at Al, col. 6.
3. See Wash. Post, June 27, 1991, at Al; Fin. Times, May 10, 1991, at 4, col. 1.
4. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1992, at Al, col. 4.
5. A major obstacle to deployment of UN troops in Croatia was removed when one
Serbian leader reversed his opposition to the presence and agreed to accept the peacekeeping
force. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1992, at A3, col. 1. At the time of writing, the Secretary General
has succeeded in negotiating a cease-fire in Somalia. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1992, at AS, col.
4.
6. The Charter states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under
the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
7. "The Security Council shall ... decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain
or restore international peace and security." Id. art. 39. "IThe Security Council ... may
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security." Id. art. 42.
8. Urquhart, Who Can Stop Civil Wars?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1991, at E9, col. 6.; see
also McFadden, supra note 2.
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allow the Organization to use military means for various humanitarian
purposes. 9 Yet military intervention is unlikely to have benign results.
History shows all too often that intervening in civil war can prolong
bloodshed, rather than ending it. Intervention can, moreover, deny people
their right of self-determination and is inherently inhumane.' 0
This paper is not an exhaustive study of civil war or self-determination.
Rather, it presents the UN's recent decisions about Iraq and Yugoslavia to
demonstrate that the UN has not abandoned the Charter prohibition on
intervention in civil war. Reviewing these decisions shows that UN members
voted against intervention to avoid prolonging civil conflict and interfering
with self-determination." Their concerns are justified and explain why the
UN should continue to resist calls to intervene militarily in civil war. The
12
UN should concentrate instead on mediating peaceful solutions.
I.

IRAQ

In August, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied its neighbor, Kuwait. 3 In
November, the UN Security Council, citing its authority in Chapter VII of
4
the Charter, authorized a coalition of states to use force to liberate Kuwait.'
As the fighting ended, Iraqi Kurds began a rebellion against the Baghdad
government. 5 The Kurds wanted the anti-Iraq coalition to liberate them,
along with Kuwait, from Saddam Hussein's government. While coalition
governments were sympathetic to the Kurds, this request immediately raised
concerns regarding the legality of intervening in Iraq to aid a secessionist
movement.
The coalition was right to be concerned. The UN Charter authorizes the
use of force but only against international aggression. While the human
rights of the Kurds are a matter of international concern, violation of
internationally protected human rights does not trigger the Security Council's
authority to use force. The Security Council may take action only to
"maintain international peace and security.' ' 6 Moreover, the Council must

9. E.g., Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT v. MIGHT 42-43 (D.
INTERVENTIoN (1988); Delbriick, A Fresh Look
at Humanitarian Intervention, 67 IND. L.J. 887 (1992).
10. O'Connell, U.N. Shouldn't Intervene Militarily in Civil Wars-Like Yugoslavia, Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 30, 1992, at All.
11. See infra notes 27-41, 56-57 and accompanying text.
12. Somalia is a good example of the right approach. The Secretary General has negotiated
a cease-fire rather than fighting for one as Urquhart would urge. See supra note 5.
13. Apple, Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil; US Condemns Attack, Urges United
Action, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
14. S.C. Res. 678, 45 U.N. SCOR (2963d mtg.) at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/Res/678 (1990)
[hereinafter S/Res/678].
Scheffer ed. 1989); F. TESON, Hum.4mTARuA

15. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
16. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 42.
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avoid interfering in internal affairs of member states by altering a state's
political arrangements. 7 Taking these rules seriously, the Security Council
authorized humanitarian relief but no intervention that might change the
political status quo.
The Council's decision to permit only humanitarian aid for the Kurds is
an important precedent for future requests for help-such as those already
received from the Croatians. The context and rationale of the Kurdish
decision should, therefore, be well understood.'
The Iraqi civil war began just as the fighting to liberate Kuwait ended
on February 28, 1991. The Kurds of northern Iraq began a rebellion against
the Iraqi government, apparently either to secede from Iraq or to establish
at least an autonomous Kurdish region. 19 This development seems to have
caught the UN and the coalition off guard. Both resisted initial calls for
intervention on behalf of the Kurds. The United States took the position
that it could not intervene militarily to support the uprisings because
intervention would be unlawful interference in Iraq's internal affairs. 20 The
French agreed with this legal assessment but argued that "[t]he law is one
thing, but the safeguard of a population is another, quite as precious, to
which humanity cannot be indifferent. ' ' 21 France said it would try to get
the law changed to allow intervention.
France could not, however, persuade the other permanent members of
the Security Council to authorize force to liberate the Kurds. Instead, the
Council ordered only humanitarian aid on the Kurds' behalf. In Resolution
688, the Council found that Iraqi attacks on the Kurds constituted a threat
to peace in the region:
The Security Council ....
1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many
parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the
consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the
region ....2

17. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
18. The organization Middle East Watch has claimed incorrectly that the actions authorized
on behalf of the Kurds constitute an authorization of humanitarian intervention to protect
human rights. Middle East Watch Report, Nov. 1991.

19. Fin. Times, Mar. 22, 1991, at 6, col. 4. Shias in southern Iraq also rebelled. Id. The
UN, however, addressed itself exclusively to the Kurds, raising the question discussed further

below of how the UN can tell which groups fighting in civil wars should be aided and which
not. Very often it will have no clear legal or ethical guidelines. The same problem arises in
Somalia, where a number of clans are currently at war. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1992, § 4, at 16,

col. 1.

20. Fin. Times, Apr. 5, 1991, at 1, col. 3; Fin. Times, Apr. 5, 1991, at 17, col. 1.
21. Fin. Times, Apr. 5, 1991, at 4, col. 4 (statement of the French Foreign Minister Roland

Dumas).
22. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/Res/688 (1991).
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In the subsequent operative paragraphs of the resolution, the Council called
on Iraq to end its repression of the Kurds and to allow international
humanitarian assistance to reach northern Iraq.2Y This is as far as the
Council could go without inviting a Chinese veto or failing to get the
required two-thirds vote of the fifteen-member Council.24 As it was, China
and India abstained from supporting the resolution, while Cuba, Yemen,
and Zimbabwe voted against it. All stated they believed the resolution
interfered in Iraq's internal affairs."
The UN would have interfered with Iraq's internal affairs if it had helped
the Kurds secede or if it rearranged Iraq's government. However, the UN
did not interfere by taking steps short of force to provide humanitarian
assistance to the Kurds. Distribution of humanitarian aid, even against the
wishes of a government in effective control, is not unlawful intervention
according to the International Court of Justice. In the Nicaragua case, the
court said:
There can be no doubt that the provision of.strictly humanitarian aid
to persons or forces in another country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as
in any other way contrary to international law.2
The type of aid supplied to the Kurds-basically food, water, and sheltercertainly fell within these parameters.

As soon as the Council approved Resolution 688, Britain and the United
States announced simultaneously that their troops in the region would
23. In the resolution, the Council:
2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to international
peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and expresses
the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that
the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected;
3. Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian
organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make
available all necessary facilities for their operations;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq
and to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the
region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the Kurdish
population, suffering from the repression in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi
authorities;
5. Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal,
including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the
critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population;
6. Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to
contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts;
7. Demands that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends;
8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Id. (emphasis in original).
24. U.N. CHAR'TER art. 27(3).
25. Int'l Herald-Tribune, Apr. 6-7, 1991, at 3.
26. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 242 (Judgment of June 27).
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administer humanitarian aid. 27 They began by distributing food. Ten days
later, however, the United States announced that its troops would also set
up camps for the refugees inside Iraq and further that it would defend the
refugees from Iraqi attack.n British, French, Dutch, and German 29 troops
soon joined the effort, excluding Iraqi troops from north of the 36th
parallel.

Creating the protective zone, however, seems to have gone beyond the
terms of Resolution 688. Yet the British have argued that 688 did provide
authority to create the zone. 0 In Resolution 688, the Security Council found
that Iraqi actions against the Kurds threatened peace in the region.31 This
language repeats the finding in Resolution 678 that Iraq threatened peace
in the region. That earlier finding prompted the Security Council to authorize
the use of "all necessary means" to implement Council resolutions calling
for the end of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and restoration of "international
peace and security to the area." 3 2 Reading 688 and 678 together, some
believe, gave coalition members authority to use "all necessary means" to
secure peace in an area that included the Kurdish region. 33 Thus, Iraq's
27. Fin. Times, Apr. 6-7, 1991, at 1, col. 3.
28. Fin. Times, Apr. 22, 1991, at 1, col. 3.
29. In a dramatic legal reassessment, the German government decided that it too could
send troops to northern Iraq without violating the German constitution. The German government explained that Germany can "use" troops outside the country, for example for humanitarian efforts, as long as it does not deploy them in the military sense. Fin. Times, Apr. 25,
1991, at 4, col. 3.
30. Fin. Times, Apr. 9, 1991, at 1, col. 3. This article reports that the British cited both
Resolution 688 and Resolution 687. It is not clear, however, how 687 could provide support
for the protective zone since it basically called for Iraq to allow access for humanitarian
groups. Id.
31. Supra text accompanying note 22.
32. The resolution states:
The Security Council,.
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter [of the United Nations],
1.Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent
relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow
Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait,
unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in
paragraph I above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to
uphold and implement [Security Council] resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent
relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;
3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken
in pursuance of paragraph 2 of [this] resolution;
4. Requests the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3
of [this] resolution;
5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
S/Res/678, supra note 14 (emphasis in original).
33. Interview with Edwin Williamson, State Department Legal Adviser, in Washington,
D.C. (Apr. 19, 1991).
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aggression against Kuwait formed the legal basis for the right to form the
protective zone, a right states would not normally have in providing humanitarian assistance.
Despite their wide authority, however, the coalition members did not
argue that they had the right to help the Kurds win their military fight
against Iraq. Resolution 688 speaks only of humanitarian measures, and
the coalition in fact limited its help to humanitarian aid. By April, when
coalition troops began arriving in northern Iraq, the Kurds were fleeing.
They were no longer resisting the Iraqis.14 Implementing a buffer between
the Iraqis and Kurds did not provide any significant military advantage to
the Kurds. Indeed, the coalition killed no Iraqis."
No coalition member urged more than humanitarian aid after early April.
The United States plainly had practical considerations in mind. It expressed
its concern about becoming involved in a long, bloody, Vietnam-type civil
war 6 It was concerned that Iraq should remain a viable country. Neither.
the United States nor anyone else could be certain that the Kurds could
form a viable state without Iraq or that their success in Iraq might not
encourage uprisings in Turkey and Iran, resulting in widespread fighting in
the region. Nor is it clear that aiding the Kurds would ultimately aid self37
determination. Who is the self? The Kurds or the Iraqi people as a whole?
Similar concerns have arisen often enough in other internal conflicts to have
fostered a general rule against military intervention in civil war."

34. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1991, at A5, col. 1.
35. The British exchanged fire with the Iraqis on one occasion but could not confirm any
Iraqi deaths. The Times (London), May 14, 1991, at 1, col 4.
36. Int'l Herald-Tribune, May 4-5, 1991; Fin. Times, Apr. 8, 1991, at 2, col. 4.
37. And, as queried supra note 19, why help the Kurds and not the Shias? International
law's current position is that states can best aid self-determination by staying out of civil war.
See generally L. Bucarr, SECESSION 43-127 (1978); Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of
MilitaryIntervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 251 (1985).
But compare the views of noninternational lawyers in A. BucHANAN, SECESSION (1991);
Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination:A TerritorialInterpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L.
177 (1991).
38. The best contemporary ideas about self-determination find the use of force inappropriate
to achieve self-determination. In international law today, the idea of self-determination of
peoples has evolved into one in which people should have the right of representative government
within the existing state (a right that may be promoted from outside only by peaceful means).
Doswald-Beck, supra note 37, at 203. As such, self-determination could not give rise to the
right of violent secession in the postcolonial context. Id. at 201. The former colonial states
themselves have taken the lead in preventing the development of a right of secession. See
CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ARICAN UNITY art. III. Thus, if groups do not have the
right to secede without first reaching consensus with the remaining state, it is clearly unlawful
for outside states to intervene on behalf of secessionist movements. Somewhat inconsistently,
the rule against aiding secessionists does not permit aid to antisecessionist forces. Nor does
international law forbid eventual recognition of secessionists. If, after internal struggle, a
secessionist group defeats antisecessionist forces, the secessionists would be in a position to
demand consensual separation. At this stage, international law permits recognition of the new
de facto state. See, for example, the circumstances of Eritrea and Ethiopia, which separated
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By the last week of April, the coalition forces were eager to extricate
their troops even from humanitarian assistance to the Kurds. The British
proposed that a United Nations police force be formed and sent to replace
coalition troops in northern Iraq. 39 The United States believed the Secretary
General could do so without a Security Council resolution. The SecretaryGeneral disagreed, however, and sought either Security Council authorization or Iraq's consent. 4° Typically, either the Council or the General Assembly authorize the sending of peacekeeping troops after receiving the consent
of all the parties to the conflict. United Nations forces are a buffer, not a
war-fighting
force, and without the parties' consent would soon become
4
casualties. 1
UN peacekeeping troops eventually replaced coalition troops to continue
to buffer the Kurds. Council members reiterated their concern that the UN
not interfere in Iraqi affairs, and only when Iraq gave its consent did UN
troops head to Iraq to replace coalition troops in June.
II.

YUGOSLAVIA

Just as UN peacekeeping troops left for Iraq in mid-summer, fighting
broke out in Yugoslavia between the province of Croatia, which had declared
its independence, and the Yugoslav federal government. 42 This conflict has
also raised the question of UN intervention in civil war. Again, however,
the Security Council has taken a meastlred and appropriate route.
In the early months of the war, the UN played no role. The European
Community (EC) wished to mediate the conflict, declaring it a European
matter. 43 But the EC had not succeeded in getting a cease-fire by midSeptember, so the Dutch called for the formation of a European force to

after peace talks in May. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1991, at 10, col. 1. Rather than speak of a
rule against secession, therefore, it is probably more correct to emphasize the rule of general
nonintervention so that people may work out their domestic affairs without foreign interference
or domination. Such interference would clearly be at odds with all notions of self-determination.
As for a right to intervene in civil war only to protect human rights and not to affect the
outcome of the civil war, there simply is no such right. See, e.g., O'Connell, Enforcing the
Prohibitionon the Use of Force, 15 S. ILL. L.J. 453, 474-75 (1991); Schachter, The Right of
States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1623 (1984); Henkin, supra note 9, at
41-42. The Security Council's reaction to the Iraqi civil war is the most recent rejection of the
claim for humanitarian intervention.
39. Fin. Times, Apr. 29, 1991, at 1, col. 3.
40. Apple, BaghdadRejects U.N. Police to Protect Kurds, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1991, at
Al, col. 6.
41. See generally M. HAtRSON, Fmazs ALL ARoUNDT m HORIZON (1989).
42. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1991, at A8, col. 5.
43. Fin. Times, Sept. 17, 1991, at 1, col. 3.
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intervene in Yugoslavia. 44 Such a force could not intervene lawfully, however,
without Security Council authorization or the consent of the parties to the
conflict. 45 The Dutch acknowledged this. Nothing came of their proposal
and by mid-November, after the Croats and the Yugoslav federal government indicated they were amenable, Britain, France, and Belgium requested
that the Security Council become involved. 46 They asked the Council to
send a peacekeeping
force and to impose a mandatory oil embargo on
47
Yugoslavia.

When the Council began consideration of the request, debating the size
and purpose of a peacekeeping force, the problem immediately arose of
what borders the force should observe. By November, Federal forces occupied almost a third of Croatia and made clear their position that any UN
force must observe the occupation borders. Croat officials, of course,
demanded the original provincial borders. This dispute raised concerns that
the parties would not consent to a peacekeeping mission. Could the force
go without consent?
As mentioned previously, Brian Urquhart has recently argued in favor of
sending a force both without consent and without a cease-fire. 4 He would
allow the force to fight until a cease-fire is established but admits this would
be a radical departure from precedent. As discussed in the previous section,
UN peacekeeping troops have only been used with the consent of the parties.
The UN plainly has the right to use troops without the consent of the target
state when the Security Council invokes its authority in Chapter VII, articles
39-43 of the Charter. But Chapter VII requires a threat to international
peace before taking action. Some states, including the United States, have
at times maintained that the Council can determine threats to peace under
article 39 even if they are noninternational. That may be, but it also seems
clear that the Council cannot order action unless it finds a threat to
international peace as it did regarding the Kurds. In the Yugoslav situation,
no outside states appear to be threatened by war or on the verge of
intervening. After nine months of fighting, the civil war has not extended
beyond Yugoslavia.

44. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1991, at A3, col. 4.
The Netherlands ... proposed today that Western European countries consider
deploying a "lightly armed" force in Yugoslavia because an international team

of 200 civilian observers had so far been unable to end the fighting.
Dutch officials said the idea of the force was not to impose a cease-fire but
rather to use a European show of arms to discourage a resumption of warfare
after a new cease-fire goes into effect.
Id.
45. Regional organizations have authority to take enforcement action after notice to the

Security Council. U.N. CHRTER art. 53.
46. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1991, at Al, col. 3.
47. Id.

48. Supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Some argue that the Council need not find an actual threat to international
peace. Because it has the sole authority to find threats to the peace without
reference to any limiting guidelines, it can find any dispute to be such a
breach-including, presumably, a war such as Yugoslavia's that has not
threatened other countries.4 9 This view holds that threats to the peace are
determined by the process of Security Council deliberation, not on the basis
of any substantive notion of what threatens international peace.
This interpretation, however, is at odds with the spirit in which the
Charter was written. Article 2(7) plainly states that the internal affairs of
members are out-of-bounds for the Organization. Civil war has always been
viewed as an internal matter. Indeed, before democracy's current popularity,
war was a typical way many states changed governments. For the UN to
be able to intervene in such matters would plainly have given it worldgovernment status.
[W]hen United Nations assistance is obtained for the purpose of imposing
by force a political settlement which could not be achieved through the
operation of the principle of self-determination-as, for example, by
conceding to the people themselves the right to determine, freely and
without compulsion, the form of their government, and the people who
shall administer their governmental machinery, or the rules to which
such government must conform-such intervention cannot be regarded
as legitimate. 0
This is plainly the case in Yugoslavia-the UN would not be able to establish
a political solution except by force and such a solution would interfere with
self-determination. Short of giving unlimited scope to the concept of threat
to the peace, there is no legal basis for UN intervention without the parties'
consent.
The closest the UN has come to intervening in a context such as Yugoslavia's was in 1960 in the Congo civil war. The Security Council initially
authorized UN intervention to counter Belgian intervention on the eve of
Congolese independence. The UN, however, ended up fighting alongside
the central government against the people of Katanga province who were
attempting to secede. The UN attempted to remain neutral but could not
and thus tipped the balance against those attempting to secede.' 1
Equally, the UN is unlikely to be able to fight neutrally to establish a
cease-fire in Yugoslavia. If either the Croatians or the Yugoslav central
government resisted, the UN would counterattack.12 The success or failure
of UN troops would then move the battle from its position at the time of
UN intervention, thus aiding or harming one side or the other side. Moreover, as with British troops in Northern Ireland, it would be difficult for

49. See N. WrE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY 50-51 (1990).
50. R. SIMMONDS, LEGAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO 111 (1968).
51. N. NV=, supra note 49, at 192-201.
52. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1992, at Al, col. 1 (EC observation helicopter shot down by
Yugoslav federal forces).
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UN troops not to develop sympathy for one side or the other. International
opinion seems to be on Croatia's side, certainly European opinion is, yet
current international law suggests the UN should side with the federal
government.5 3 While the Charter grants peoples, such as the Croatians, the
right of self-determination, this right is best interpreted as a right of
representative government, not a right to disrupt Yugoslavia's territorial
integrity. 4 To avoid being in the middle of a clash between law and emotion,
the UN is best advised to intervene only after a cease-fire and with consent
of both sides.
On November 27, the parties in Yugoslavia did give their consent to a
UN presence, and the Council adopted a resolution authorizing a 10,000person force."5 This will be the largest force deployed since the UN intervention in the Congo. At time of writing, however, it has yet to be sent.
The Secretary-General has vowed that it will not be sent until Yugoslavia
has a viable cease-fire. Despite the size of this force, the Secretary-General
still does not see it as a war-fighting force. It is not meant to intervene in
56
the war to unsettle the status quo but to act only as a buffer.
In the meantime, the Secretary-General tried to convince Germany and
other states not to recognize Croatia. The Secretary-General believes recognition will prevent an overall political settlement of the crisis.5 7 For the
recognizing state, recognition means the fighting is no longer a civil war
but an international war. States may then intervene at the request of a
government being attacked from outside. 8 Germany has not said it will
send troops or aid to Croatia after recognition; it has done so to diminish
the Yugoslav government's interest in fighting. 9 Unless one can be certain
of this outcome, however, surely the best solution is to provide only lawful
0
humanitarian aid and use peaceful means to encourage settlement.6
CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War has invigorated the UN. Unfortunately, it has
also encouraged conditions favorable to increased civil war. This concurrence
of events should not, however, encourage UN military intervention in civil
53. See supra note 38.
54. Id.
55. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1991, at Al, col. 6. The size of the force has since been enlarged
to 14,000. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1992, at A3, col. 1.
56. See supra note 5.
57. Germany believes early recognition would have. the opposite effect by reducing Yugoslavian government incentives to fight a recognized state. See Frankfurter Allgemeine, Jan. 6,
1992 at 1, col. 5.
58. Some French politicians have urged France to recognize Croatia for this very reason,
urging France to send troops to Croatia. Reuters, Oct. 16, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni

file).

59. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1991, at A3, col 1; see also supra note 38. After the secessionist
group succeeds in reaching a consensual agreement with the antisecessionist forces, recognition
is appropriate.
60. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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war. Under current law, the UN may not intervene in civil war without
consent. Nor should the rules on nonintervention be changed: as an organization of equal states, the UN cannot be the arbiter of which nations
should remain together and which should break up. It should certainly try
to help mediate peaceful solutions but should not use military means to
impose political settlements. Such means do not advance self-determination,
human rights, or humanitarian interests.

